Phillips Curve

How the Phillips Curve Shaped Full Employment Policy in the 1970s: the Debates on the Humphrey-Hawkins Act

This article relates the history of economists' influence in shaping the content of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act (1978) and its immediate consequences. The act committed the federal government to reducing unemployment to 4 percent and inflation to 3 percent as soon as 1983. Initially, the Humphrey-Hawkins bill was conceived as a project to favor the economic integration of African Americans and economic planning and targeted only the unemployment rate. Republican senators successfully pushed for adding a numerical inflation target during the debates in Congress. The act eventually put on equal footing inflation and unemployment. This article argues that the economists in the Carter administration, and notably the Council of Economic Advisers, were instrumental, even if unintentionally, in favoring the integration of an inflation target and such an interpretation of the bill. In the negotiations that opposed them to the supporters of the bill, as well as in the analysis of the bill they produced, they insisted on the existence of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment and referred frequently to the famous Phillips curve. They endeavored to anchor their expertise on academic publications, which strengthened the role of the Phillips curve in shaping the debates. Business organizations and senators used references to the trade-off to undermine the bill and favor the integration of an inflation target.

Robert J. Gordon and the Introduction of the Natural Rate Hypothesis in the Keynesian Framework

This article studies the dissemination of the Natural Rate of Unemployment Hypothesis (NRH) in macroeconomics during the 1970s, by studying the reaction of Robert J. Gordon to the argument of Friedman (1968). In the early 1970s, Gordon opposed the NRH, arguing that the estimated parameter on expected inflation was below one. Confronting to new data and to rising inflation, Gordon adopted the NRH after 1973. Nevertheless, the adoption anticipated any clear empirical proof. We explain that this conversion was due to Friedman’s influence on Gordon, but also to the fact it did not prevent Gordon to support active stabilization policies.